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We live in a world of paradoxes and puzzles. Of course it was always so, 
but now more than ever in history we are both well informed and 
confused. The collapse of communism and the triumph of 
“globalization” were supposed to put us all on the same page; instead, 
near-universal literacy has us reading from a thousand disconnected 
pages. 
 
Conventional wisdom among some has it that the twin triumphs of free 
markets and free trade have universalized political and personal 
philosophies. Nowhere is this belief more prevalent than among 
professional economists. Indeed, since the collapse of communism and 
the near-hegemony of Anglo-American economics, one of the joys of 
practicing the dismal science has become traveling to corners of the 
newly-capitalist world and meeting like-minded academics who not only 
speak good English but were trained from the same textbooks. In recent 
years I have experienced such joys in places like Kiev and Karlsbad, 
Sofia and Skopje, Prishtina and Phnom Phen, Beijing and Bucharest: 
places that one or two decades ago were xenophobic bastions of 
communism, despotism or both.   
 
                                           
1 I am extremely grateful to Vivek Dehejia for conceiving and creating the Festschrift at Carleton  in 
my honor with his usual meticulous flair. Steven Davis provided not only a multitude of perceptive 
written comments but also  spent a rainy afternoon discussing them with me  in a Montreal coffee 
shop.  
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Economic theory and evidence offers the core, coherent rationalization 
of what’s good about capitalism and globalization: free markets and 
free trade.  Everyone who purports to understand the modern world 
should understand that core message. Its logic is unassailable.  The 
prima facie benefits from free markets and free trade derive from the 
premise of gains from trade. When one person voluntarily sells to a 
second person, who voluntarily buys from the first, both must be better 
off: otherwise they wouldn’t do it. Hence the premise of gains from 
voluntary trade is virtually tautological. The premise of mutual gains 
from free international trade is an extension of this tautology. 
 
Yet economists alienate as many intelligent people as they convince, 
probably more. The reasons are multifold, but have much to do with 
economists’ arrogance and imperialism. Many economists, not the best 
of the breed but maybe the bulk of the breed, leave non-economists with 
the impression they’re simply stupid if they don’t subscribe to a set of 
“facts”, and if they don’t subscribe to a political and even personal 
philosophy that supposedly derives from the narrow logic of gains from 
free trade.   
 
Let me offer a fictional example of the arrogance and imperialism that 
second-rate economists bring to the table: often quite literally to the 
table. Anyone who has spent much time socially with people in our 
profession knows how vociferous and venomous dinner table 
conversation can become. 
 
An economist at the table, after a few drinks, offers the following 
comment, hoping to draw dissent from his non-economist dinner 
companions: “When two people voluntarily trade with each other, both are 
better off.” He is confident that he can defend this near-tautology and tout 
his erudition to all present. 
 
But soon the dinner-table conversation becomes twisted.  The committed 
economist, after a more few drinks, vouchsafes to the ravishing artiste on 
his left: “Well of course gains from free trade means that government 
should never regulate trade”. “Ok”, she agrees, mostly because she’s 
bored and wants to change the subject. “Yes” he goes on, “We must vote 
the [expletive deleted] Silly Socialist Party out of office because they’re 
killing business.” L’artiste is now not so sure she still agrees since the SSP 
is funding her gigantic city sculpture (costing tax-payers money and also 
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complicating the lives of real estate developers). “Yes”, the silly economist 
goes on, “if only uneducated voters understood the simple logic of markets 
they would understand how much better off both artistes and communities 
at large would be without zoning, planning and other intrusive aspects of 
governments at all levels. If people really want sculptures they can form 
an art club, pool funds to buy art work, put a big wall around it and allow 
paid-up members to come inside. Or just charge admission.”  
 
Now my example is itself a bit silly and a bit exaggerated, but not by 
much. I know hundreds of professional colleagues who love to push 
artistes into corners this way, often under the illusion that they’re 
demonstrating their superior intellects and educations. Of course I 
know thousands more economists who are not so narrow-minded. 
Nevertheless most economists leave the other side of the “free trade” 
coin unexamined, mostly because it’s a hard side to defend. 
 
I too find it hard to defend. Any well-trained economist can defeat an 
anti-free-trader on logical grounds. Yet economists must move beyond 
that logic if they are ever to communicate meaningfully with artistes. 
Or with left-wingers, anti-capitalists, anti-globalists, and anti-
Americans, with whom the world is replete. A common lament among 
academic economists is that outside the economics department, the 
entire university is replete with such ignorami - sociologists, political 
scientists, psychologists, ‘touchy-feelies’ - they’ve even infiltrated 
business schools, it is said. How many times have I heard my colleagues 
say something like, “It’s frightening how our students are indoctrinated 
by those ‘diversity’ courses they’re forced to take these days”? 
 
But I digress. Back to globalization. And paradoxes. Insofar as 
globalization simply means free international trade, its economic 
benefits are almost self-evident. But there is a yawning gap between the 
logic of economic gains from free international trade and people’s 
instinctual yearning for locally-  rather than foreign-produced goods, 
and beyond that, their yearning for ‘fairness’ and for community.  
 
Paradoxically, in a world that is more globalized than ever before in 
history, ethically-sensitive people wonder whether free international 
trade is ‘fair’. ‘Fairness’ in trade is a concept that is anathema to most 
mainstream economists because it falls outside the logic underlying 
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gains from trade.2 Moreover, people in our globalized world want more 
than ever to band together in communities, communities that may 
interfere with free trade or free choice. For example, what is the logic, 
indeed the morality, of passports and restrictions on immigration? Yet 
voters want them.  
  
Beyond people’s yearnings and perceptions, our globalized world is 
paradoxical in practice as well.  A world that is more globalized than 
ever before ought to be homogeneous, or at least converging toward 
homogeneity. This would imply more political union: more inclusive 
political and military alliances and fewer and fewer independent 
countries. As a byproduct it would imply fewer regional wars. It would 
also imply more economic union: fewer and fewer barriers to trade, 
fewer independent currencies, and more cross-border cooperation in 
monetary, fiscal and regulatory policies.  
 
It would imply more universal thinking, in terms of politics, geography, 
ethnicity, philosophy and religion. It would imply complicit convergence 
toward cultural homogeneity. It would imply dominance of academic 
disciplines and philosophical ideals that both describe and prescribe 
rational behavior, at the expense of those that emphasize “unscientific” 
singularity. By corollary, it would imply the commercialization of art 
and the death of religion.  
 
Instead, what do we find in our globalized 21st century world? Here is a 
laundry list of puzzles and paradoxes.  
 
More countries than ever before in history. 
 
No diminution of regional conflict, despite replacement of bipolar, 
nuclear-backed military hegemony with unipolar American military 
hegemony.  
 
More regional trade agreements than ever before in history, in the context 
of stalled multilateral trade talks.  
 
                                           
2 Joseph Stiglitz is one of the first mainstream economists to take seriously the complaint that “free” 
trade is not always fair. He argues that in practice international trade is often  not truly free: instead 
it is distorted by tariffs, subsidies and other rules of trade that benefit rich and powerful countries, to 
the detriment of the poor and weak.  See Stiglitz (2002, 2005, 2006). 
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“Multinational” corporations that primarily operate regionally3.  
 
More currencies than ever before in history.4 Academic controversy about 
flexible versus fixed or common currencies that is as intense as it was fifty 
years ago.  
 
Heightened geographic hubris at regional, national and community levels.  
 
Heightened ethnic awareness, despite unprecedented migration and also 
inter-marriage. 
 
Heightened religious hubris, and polarization toward fundamentalist 
extremes.  
 
Intense concern about cultural identities in the context of globalization 
and “Americanization”. 
 
Less equitable income and wealth distribution both within most 
‘globalized’ countries, and between most countries.   
 
Poor countries lending much more money to rich countries than vice-
versa.5,6  
 
Developing countries that borrow capital from the rest of the world grow 
more slowly than those that lend to the rest of the world.  
 
No consensus about the universal feasibility or even desirability of 
democracy. 
 
No consensus even among democratic, capitalist countries about optimal 
government involvement in their economies. 
                                           
3 On this, see Rugman (2005). 
 
4 This is not quite true. The number of currencies peaked in 2000 at 159, and now stands at 147: see a 
remarkable new book advocating a single global currency, Bonpasse (2006).  
5 A concise and seminal analysis was Lucas (1990).  The starkest single manifestation of this 
phenomenon currently is the hundreds of billions of dollars in U.S. Treasury bonds currently held by 
the People’s Bank of China.  
  
6 In 2006, emerging economies (led by China and a few oil exporters) will run a current account 
surplus greater than $500 billion, whereas the developed economies combined will run a current 
account deficit of $700 billion (the U.S. deficit alone will be larger than this).  
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Many people in ex-communist countries claiming to be worse off under 
capitalism.  
 
Increasing awareness among economists that other disciplines, 
particularly psychology, can shed light on human behavior. Accumulating 
evidence that even economic and financial behavior is sometimes 
systematically non-rational. 
 
These are paradoxes and puzzles that inhabit a world that by many 
measures is more globalized than ever before in human history.  The 
common threads are diversity, disparity, anomaly, inconsistency, and 
incongruity. But are these really paradoxes? Are they really puzzles? 
And are they really new? 
 
I will talk today about only a few of them. The rest will be part of a 
forthcoming book.  
 
New countries 
 
Consider new countries. A proximate reason for the proliferation of new 
countries since World War II is the demise of colonialism and then of 
communism. In 1947, India won independence from Britain and then 
split along religious lines into three countries.7 In the 1950s and 1960s, 
more than a dozen African colonies became countries, as well as several 
in the Caribbean and Asia. 
 
In 1989, when Solidarity beat the communists at the polls in Poland, the 
signal to Central and Eastern Europe sounded strong and clear: 
Moscow would no longer block local democracy.  East Berliners 
stormed their Wall, and communist governments in Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania8 and the Baltic states were ousted.   In 
1991, after the Soviet Union collapsed, half a dozen “Socialist 
Republics” declared independence. In the same year, encouraged by the 
                                           
7 More precisely, India won independence from Britain in 1947 and remained secular, while Pakistan 
(west and east) broke away from India and formed itself into an Islamic state. East Pakistan then 
broke away in 1971 to form Bangladesh. 
 
8 Romania’s revolution did not come at the polls but rather with the execution in late December 1989 
of Nicolae Corcesceau, whose brutal rule culminated with the slaughter of dozens of protesting 
students.  
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rise of new states surrounding them, four Yugoslavian Republics fought 
for their independence from Serbia; in mid-2006, a fifth (Montenegro) 
voted itself out of its union with Serbia, and soon a sixth (Kosovo) will 
as well. Iraq may soon split into three parts. Palestine will surely 
become a country. Northern Ireland may be next. Scotland and Wales 
will not, but debate about “devolution” of powers within Britain is alive 
and well.  
 
Is this proliferation of countries new? And is it paradoxical, in the 
context of globalization? On the surface it is both. It is new because 
never before in human history have so many countries asserted their 
nationhood in so short a span of time, both benignly at the polls and in 
the United Nations and other global forums, and belligerently in wars of 
“liberation” as well as wars of aggression. And it is paradoxical because 
not only might globalization in its narrow economic sense of increased 
cross-border trade and investment seem bound to unite and 
homogenize, so too might the apparent philosophical convergence that 
came with the collapse of communism have been expected to put us all 
on the same page politically.9  
 
However it did not put us on the same page. Both colonialism and 
communism discouraged nationhood, albeit in different ways. Tribal, 
ethnic, religious and cultural loyalties were all suppressed in the 
interests of ruling powers or in the interests of ruling ideologies. But 
capitalism and democracy does not suppress such loyalties. Neither 
necessarily does independent statehood even when it comes without 
capitalism or democracy. Hence some or all of these loyalties have 
flowered in newly independent countries that span the spectrum from 
capitalism and democracy to their antitheses: countries that span the 
spectrum from India to Malaysia to Macedonia to North Korea.    
 
In short, part of the paradox of pervasive localism within a globalizing 
world is explained by two historic events that coincided with the rise of  
globalism: the demise of colonialism, and then the demise of 
communism. We could call this a temporal paradox, grounded in history 
and politics. It should not be surprising that a mere half-century of 
                                           
 
9 As posited  famously by Francis Fukuyama (2002) in The End of History and the Last Man. 
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accelerated globalization has not diminished longstanding sentiments of 
nationalism that were suppressed by colonialism and communism.   
 
Higher incomes but more inequality10  
 
Perhaps more surprising, at least to economists, is a spatial paradox: by 
many measures, income gaps between rich and poor have widened, both 
within countries and between countries. Moreover perceived gaps in 
well-being often exaggerate these income gaps, because globalized 
information, television in particular, has made most poor people acutely 
aware of how the other half lives.  The late 20th century bequeathed to 
the 21st century free markets and free politics for much of the world’s 
population, but by the same token it bequeathed a paradoxical mix of 
equality and inequality, and of opportunity and frustrated opportunity, 
both disparities  heightened by modern communications that have 
raised expectations everywhere.  
 
Despite the undisputed fact that most people’s incomes have increased 
much more rapidly than they would have in a localized world, many 
people believe that because of globalization, they are economically 
worse off.  These beliefs are rarely true in terms of absolute income, but 
they are often true in terms of relative income. Economists are only 
beginning to come to terms with what social psychologists have known 
for a long time: people care at least as much about their incomes 
relative to their expectations, and about their incomes relative to their 
peers and cohorts, as they do about their absolute incomes.  
 
Many people whose incomes are higher objectively as the result of 
globalization subjectively perceive themselves to be worse off 
economically, and in many cases they are wrong. Nevertheless the 
brutal reality is that objectively they are often right, particularly in 
terms of relative income.  The facts are these: Average incomes have 
risen in virtually all countries that have opened themselves even 
partially to free trade in goods, services and financial flows. Moreover 
both the number and the percentage of people in poverty have declined. 
This is true even if we measure poverty relatively rather than 
absolutely: in other words, the distribution of income globally is more 
                                           
10 The best single source on global income distribution, concisely covering measurement 
methodology, conceptual issues and actual data,  is Campano and Salvatore (2006).  
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equitable. And beyond pecuniary income, broader measures of welfare 
– such as the UN’s “Human Development Index” (which factors in 
education and longevity as well as income) - have improved both on 
average and in terms of disparity.   
 
Nevertheless, average-income gaps between many countries have 
increased, as have income gaps within most countries (notably in the 
U.S. among major developed countries and in China among large 
developing countries).11 This apparent contradiction with data showing 
that income distribution is more equitable globally leads to endless 
argument between those who claim globalization has made the rich 
richer and the poor poorer, and those who claim the opposite.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
i
 BOX 1  
 
Average income versus median income 
 
And why US average income is the highest in the world, but US median 
income is not.  
 
By definition, half of any population is above the median, and half 
below. If the distribution of income is skewed toward the top, with a 
disproportionately small number of people earning very high 
incomes, the average will above the median, and vice versa.1 Crudely 
put, countries with more equitable income distributions have average 
incomes closer to median incomes. Hence we have the paradox that  
although U.S. average income is and has been for over a century the 
highest in the world,* there are a dozen or more major countries 
where median incomes are higher. 
 
* This is true except for brief periods, such as the late 1980s, when the U.S. dollar was unusually 
low relative to other major currencies. The only persistent exception is the small country of 
Luxembourg, which is populated heavily by well-paid bankers and bureaucrats.   
                                          
1 One simple measure of income inequality within countries is the difference between average 
ncome and median income. See Box 1.  
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Superficially, the contradiction is fairly easy to resolve. Income 
distribution across the entire world’s population has indeed become 
more equitable. But both between many countries and within most 
countries it has become less equitable. The reason is that China and 
India together account for one third of the world’s population. Their 
average income relative to the rest of the world has risen sufficiently to 
make global income distribution more equitable. Nevertheless a large 
number of less populated countries – notably in sub-Saharan Africa but 
also in parts of Asia and Latin America – have become poorer relative 
to other countries. Not only that, income distribution within most 
countries has become less equitable: in developed countries, in 
developing countries, and in countries that underwent transition from 
communism to capitalism during the 1990s.  
 
We have good made-in-Canada evidence of increased inequality within 
developed countries, especially the U.S. A carefully constructed “Index 
of Labour Market Well-being” for the OECD, constructed by Lars 
Osberg of Dalhousie University in Halifax and Andrew Sharpe of the 
Centre for the Study of Living Standards in Ottawa,  shows that 
between 1980 and 2001, the “labour market equality” component of 
ILMW for the U.S. fell from .27 to .08. For Canada it started much 
higher and fell much less, from .46 to .42. Most of the 16 OECD 
countries that Osberg and Sharpe rank also fell, notably the U.K., from 
.71 to .60. But 6 countries actually rose on the equality index: Belgium, 
Finland, Germany (markedly, from .75 to .84), Japan, Norway and 
(very slightly) Switzerland.12
 
Osberg and Sharpe’s evidence is for equality within labor income, but 
at least recently labor income seems also to have fallen behind relative 
to capital income. Since the bottom of the last U.S. recession in 2001, 
labor’s share in income has risen by just 11%, versus 16% for capital. 
Canadian, European and Japanese data are similar. The conventional 
explanation of labor’s falling share is competition from labor-intensive 
imports. Recent research for the U.S. by Ian Dew-Becker and Robert 
Gordon (2005) shows that although labor’s share in GDP relative to 
capital’s actually rose between 1966 and 2001, inequality within labor 
                                           
12 See Osberg and Sharp (2004).  
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income increased significantly: this is consistent with Osberg and 
Sharpe’s index.    
 
Logic for increased income inequality and income insecurity 
 
We have noted thus far that the past half century has seen increased 
absolute income for the vast majority of the world’s population, as well 
as increased relative income for a smaller majority. We have also noted 
that a substantial minority is relatively worse off. Some of that minority 
has fallen behind relative to average incomes in other countries; many 
have fallen behind relative to average incomes in their own countries. 
Globalization is part of the reason for this, but only part. The other part 
is technical advance. Technical advance interacts with free markets and 
globalization both to raise average incomes and to change the 
distribution of incomes around average incomes.  
 
Moreover because that distribution is in rapid flux, many individual 
incomes have become less secure, and, more dramatically, income-
security gaps between the U.S. and other rich countries have widened.13 
Particularly in the U.S., people whose absolute and even relative 
incomes have increased are nevertheless more insecure about their 
incomes in future. Can this too be attributed to globalization?  
 
More generally, can we construct a theoretical logic that attributes both 
income inequality and income insecurity to globalization? If we can, 
then economists must on logical concede some ground to anti-globalists. 
And on moral grounds, they should offer policy alternatives that offer 
amelioration of inequality and insecurity, and estimate the costs of these 
policy alternatives.  
 
Here is a plausible line of logic. Free14 domestic markets, in goods, 
services, labor, natural resources and capital, act powerfully to allocate 
rewards within countries according to productivity – or, in the case of 
stock markets, expected productivity. Hence for example in the U.S. 
                                           
13The labor market security component of Osberg and Sharpe’s ILMW actually rose in all but 3 of 
their 16 ranked OCED countries. But all 3 countries that fell started from high levels of security, and 
in 2001 all 3 still had security indices higher than the U.S.’s .26: Australia’s is .30, Denmark’s .37, 
and Sweden’s .87.  
 
14 By “free” I mean, roughly, “unregulated, or at least lightly regulated”. 
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during the late 1990s, a proliferation of so-called “dot com” 
entrepreneurs became millionaires because the markets expected them 
to be extraordinarily productive. They coexisted with unskilled workers 
earning stagnant or even declining wages because their productivity was 
going nowhere. Similarly, free international markets in goods, services, 
labor and capital – in other words “globalization” – act powerfully to 
allocate rewards between countries according to current and expected 
productivity.  
 
Insecurity 
 
It seems plausible to suggest that the modern world’s combination of 
free markets, rapid technical advance, and their pervasive spread 
internationally has not only increased average incomes world-wide, but 
has also led to rapid movements both up and down the income scale for 
millions of individuals. These individuals sell their newly appreciated or 
depreciated assets, be they goods, services, labor, natural resources or 
capital, on markets that price those assets more precisely and more 
rapidly than ever before in human history, and that translate these 
assets into incomes more precisely and more rapidly than ever before.   
In short, it seems eminently plausible that freer markets, technical 
change and globalization have interacted not only to increase individual 
incomes worldwide, but also to make them less secure.  
 
Our reasoning thus far does not imply that the spread of incomes around 
the average has increased; it just implies that rapidity of movement 
around the average has increased.  But dispersion of incomes has in fact 
increased, at least between many countries, and within most countries. 
Let’s look first at inequality between countries.  
 
Inequality between countries 
 
Income dispersion has actually narrowed between some countries: 
notably between India, China and much of Southeast Asia on the one 
hand, and Western Europe, North America and Japan on the other. 
Partly because India and China are so populous, income dispersion has 
also narrowed across the world’s entire population.  But it has 
nevertheless widened between many countries, notably between sub-
Saharan Africa and us.  
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A simple (though admittedly partial) explanation for this puzzle is that 
much of Asia globalized, but most of Africa did not. First China, and 
now India, have dramatically freed up their markets, both internally 
and externally. They and the East Asian so-called “dragons” and 
“tigers” have adopted modern technology, at first by opening up to 
investment and technology transfer from abroad, but increasingly via 
domestic research and development. Sub-Saharan Africa, by contrast, 
has neither freed up its internal and external markets, nor has it 
attracted foreign direct investment and the embodied technology. In 
short, globalization has been a force for narrowing income gaps 
between countries because it enables poor countries that globalize to 
“catch up” with richer ones that already have. But by the same token, 
poor countries that do not globalize fall behind. 
     
Inequality within countries 
 
But why has income dispersion within countries increased? The answer 
lies with much the same phenomena that explain increases in income 
insecurity. Free markets allow the returns on labor, capital and natural 
resources to be allocated “efficiently”. By this, economists mean that 
income accrues or does not accrue to the owners of those “factors of 
production” –  labor, natural resources and capital - according to their 
productivity or lack thereof.15 For example it means that people with 
“productive human capital’’ -  that is, the kinds of education, skills and 
talents that other people value - will earn higher incomes than people 
with “unproductive human capital” -  that is, people whose education, 
skills and talents do not equip them to produce services that people are 
prepared to buy. Simply put, this latter group of people do not meet the 
standards of the market, even though they may be immensely talented 
by other standards (for example the standards of an artistic, cultural or 
religious elite).  
  
This state of affairs, which could be called “market meritocracy”, has 
never existed anywhere in the real world. However, much of the world 
is closer to such a state than ever before in human history. The efficient 
allocation of factors to their most productive uses – most productive in 
the sense that they are used to deliver the products that people are most 
                                           
15 In an economist’s dream world of perfect competition, zero restrictions on trade, and no ‘shocks’ 
(such as wars or sharp hikes in oil prices), a ‘steady state’ should rise wherein ‘on the margin’ all 
factors of production earn the same rate of return.  
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willing to pay for – is the reason that the market has been able to 
harness technology and bring the world a higher standard of living than 
ever before. Per capita incomes are indisputably higher, on average. But 
so too is income insecurity, both because technology and tastes change 
rapidly, and because free markets quickly reward those who can deliver 
the new products than people want, and punish those who cannot.  
 
We still have not yet answered our question: why is income distribution 
widening within countries that have embraced free markets both 
internally and internationally? Our logic thus far, that technology and 
free trade raises incomes but increases income insecurity does not 
clearly imply that incomes concentrate at the top. Yet the evidence is 
that in many modern globalized countries they do. The process seems to 
be more pronounced in North America and the UK, where markets by 
many measures are less regulated than in continental Western Europe 
or most of Asia. But the process is pronounced there too. And it is more 
pronounced in countries that have only recently embraced free markets, 
notably ex-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, as well 
as Russia and the former Soviet Union.  
 
Bearing in mind the perils of pulling too many disparate countries 
under one theoretical umbrella, let’s advance a plausible extension of 
the “market meritocracy” thesis. During the past decade or two, 
developed countries have entered an epochal era of rapid technical 
change: what Alan Greenspan first sensed was a “New Economy”, and 
what Richard Lipsey, much more systematically, attributes to four or 
five, “General Purpose Technologies” that, along with 19 others 
(beginning with “domestication of plants”) have transformed economies 
between 9000 BC and the present.16 In eras such as these, vast fortunes 
are rapidly made and lost.  
 
Arguably, in the present era fortunes are often made and lost much 
more rapidly than in previous such eras: first, because technology 
evolves (and becomes obsolete) more rapidly; second, because finance is 
more efficient, and hence raising venture capital is easier, as is investing 
                                           
16 The five ‘transforming General Purpose Technologies’ that Lipsey et al. (2005), in their Table 5.1, 
identify for the late-20th century and 21st century are “Computer, Lean Production, Internet, 
Biotechnology and (potentially) Nanotechnology. It is notable that their GPTs are occurring with 
exponential frequency. Half of their 24 GPTs since 9000 BC were innovated since 1800, including 
almost one third in the 20th century.   
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in such ventures; third because capital moves more easily across 
borders; fourth because goods move more easily across borders 
allowing entrepreneurs who live and produce in small countries to 
achieve scale economies by selling to large markets; and finally because 
both people and ideas move more rapidly. It might seem reasonable to 
argue that these five phenomena have not only increased the volatility of 
incomes, they have also increased the upper the limits on incomes. 
Upper limits on incomes are increased by unprecedented technology, by 
the unprecedented availability of capital, and by unprecedented scale 
economies, both in terms of inputs to production and in terms of 
outputs. This is the case whether incomes derive from human capital, 
from physical capital, or from natural resources. For example since 
OPEC first felt its oats in 1973, the leverage of both countries and 
individuals who are well-endowed with oil has surely increased because 
the market for oil is so much bigger, not least because of demand from 
China.  
 
Yet this argument is readily turned on its head. Just as we argued that 
the fruits of technology are more easily harvested by means of modern 
finance and mobile factors of production, we could argue that the fruits 
are more widely distributed. Impoverished entrepreneurs and inventors 
can more readily raise physical capital; young people can more readily 
acquire human capital; goods and services can more easily be sold on 
world markets; ideas and technology move more easily around the 
globe. Is it really true that wealth and incomes are concentrating at the 
top more rapidly in this era than they did during and after the 
Industrial Revolution? 
 
After a trend toward equality that began in the early 20th century, 
wealth and income distribution in the U.S., and to a lesser extent in most 
other industrialized countries, began to become less equal in the 1970s.  
The trend accelerated in the 1990s with the advent of the new 
information-technology economy. To be sure, wealth and incomes have 
not yet re-concentrated at the top to the extent that they had in America 
or Britain by the turn of the last century. This could be because the New 
Economy hasn’t been in place long enough. Another reason may be 
that, in contrast to the period following the Industrial Revolution and 
right up until mid-20th century, virtually all industrialized countries 
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(except Canada) now impose progressive income taxes and estate 
taxes.17  
 
BOX 2 
 
The U.S. levies a federal tax of 55% on estates above $2 million, and in 
addition many states impose death duties, so that the total can be as 
high as 90%. Since 1994 wealthy American families have spent about 
$500 million to lobby for repeal of these taxes, and repeal is being 
considered seriously by the Republican administration as it prepares 
for mid-term elections in November 2006. Interestingly, their efforts 
have been given pause by America’s two richest men, Bill Gates and 
Warren Buffet. Buffet’s characteristically blunt comment is this: 
“Repealing the estate tax is equivalent to choosing the 2020 Olympic 
Team by picking the eldest sons of gold-medal winners in the 2000 
Olympics.” 
However it is not clear that punitive U.S. estate taxes have deterred 
recent trends toward increased inter-generational wealth concentration. 
America is no longer quite the legendary land of opportunity it once 
was: inter-generational mobility is now higher in Canada (despite 
Canada’s abolishment of its estate tax in 1972), and in several European 
countries.18  
 
“Star” incomes 
 
The past few decades’ gradual increase in wealth and income inequality 
may or may not persist. But one phenomenon does seem both new and 
puzzling. Over the past decade or two, “star” incomes have escalated. 
Movie stars, sports stars and corporate stars are the most evident. For 
example the average income of a Fortune 500 chief executive in the U.S. 
is now over 300 times that of the average U.S. hourly wage, whereas 10 
years ago the multiple was less than 100. This is commonly attributed to 
flawed corporate governance: the interests of shareholders are distorted 
by the self-interests of managers. That explanation is plausible, partly 
                                           
17 In 1972, Canada replaced its estate tax by a capital gains tax of up to 25% upon death or departure 
from the country.  
18 For a survey of recent evidence, see The Economist (2006a). 
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because CEO/worker wage ratios in the U.S. and to a lesser extent in 
Canada are substantially higher than in Europe or Asia. The 
‘governance’ explanation has become more popular since the scandals 
that befell Arthur Anderson, Enron and WorldCom early in this 
century.   
 
However Europe and Asia have had their share of corporate scandals 
too: they simply took different forms. Japan’s were suppressed for so 
long that they turned the equity and real estate crash of 1989 into a 15 
year recession. And in 1997, Southeast Asia’s “crony capitalism” 
triggered a financial and macroeconomic crash that was much sharper 
though much less prolonged.19  
 
A more fundamental explanation for “star” salaries may be the same 
one I have advanced for income insecurity and income inequality: 
“market meritocracy” that is leveraged by new technology, abundant 
capital and large markets. Rather than try to explain the uniqueness of 
U.S. corporate salaries by the dubious ascription of inferior corporate 
governance, we might instead start by observing that the U.S. economy 
enjoys labor, product and capital  markets that are not only the world’s 
most efficient and least regulated, but also the world’s largest, richest 
and even most “adventurous”.20 In terms of product (though not labor) 
markets, Canada, which enjoys virtually free trade with the U.S., is not 
far behind. On balance, pan-European markets remain much more 
regulated: despite the EU they are still de facto relatively segmented. So 
are markets both within and between Asian countries.  
 
The mobility of the U.S. labor market means that CEOs readily move 
between firms; but more importantly, the efficiently and size of the U.S. 
product and capital markets means that an even slightly more 
productive or suitable manager can leverage his or her salary into huge 
increases in revenues and profits. A $10 million bonus is only one 
percent of the billion dollar profit increase that could come from hiring 
just the right CEO.  
                                           
19 For an analysis of the “crony capitalism” and competing theses of  Asia’s financial crisis, see Dean 
(2000, 2001).  
 
20 It can be argued that the willingness of American consumers to try new products (and also to buy 
on credit and save so little) is a crucial spur to American innovation and entrepreneurship.   
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Of course this argument must be tempered by the reality that in a 
globalized world of free trade and cheap transportation, CEOs from 
small-market countries like Sweden or the Netherlands should in 
principle be able to leverage their salaries similarly. And also, isn’t it 
true that China, not America, is now the world’s workshop? Why 
doesn’t access to the world’s markets make China’s CEOs as rich as 
America’s?  
 
The answer is that America is no longer just the world’s workshop for 
manufactured goods; rather it is also the world’s workshop for products 
that embody much more human capital. America, more than any other 
country, now exports what accountants call “invisibles”: legal, financial, 
accounting and consulting services. America also dominates the world’s 
entertainment services, notably, in film, television and music. Despite its 
huge current account deficit in merchandise, the U.S. runs a substantial 
surplus in services.  Hence “star” salaries apply not only to CEOs, but 
also to investment bankers and lawyers, not to mention movie stars. 
And their markets are not just America’s (which is already the world’s 
largest and richest), they are truly global. American investment bankers 
manage the mergers and acquisitions that are prompted by Europe’s 
rapidly-unifying product and capital markets; American law firms have 
long since set up shop in the business capitals of the world; and 
American movie stars and musicians command a global audience. The 
leveraging this global market makes possible means that extravagant 
‘star’ salaries make sense for purely profit motives.  
 
Cultural catharsis  
 
Of course American dominance of the global entertainment industry is 
also one reason for much of the world’s ambivalence about 
“globalization”. Consuming Japanese cars does not challenge foreign 
cultures, but watching American movies does. Over the past century, 
Americans for their part have felt threatened by foreign cultures only 
rarely and briefly, for example in the late 1980s when a wave of  
Japanese investment culminated in the purchase of Universal Studios, 
the ultimate American cultural icon.  But the rest of the world feels 
seriously threatened by American culture, because the American media, 
and American movies in particular, are at once so seductive and so 
surreptitiously erosive of local and traditional values. Paradoxically, 
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Canada is at once the most Americanized of cultures and the most 
paranoid about it.21
 
Economists discover “happiness” 
 
Thus far we have observed that widespread popular ambivalence about 
free trade and “globalization” is in good part grounded in the suspicion 
that it has led to greater income disparities.   By many measures this is 
in fact true. But it is also true that in countries open to free trade, most 
people at the bottom of the income distribution, though relatively worse 
off, are absolutely better off. But this may not make them happier. 
Popular unease about globalization is compounded by its cultural 
baggage: many, not just the relatively poor,  are worried about 
homogenization, or, worse, Americanization. To delve deeper into the 
disquiet that surrounds globalization, economists must consult other 
disciplines such as history, philosophy, theology and psychology. 
  
Over the past two decades, collaboration with psychology has proved 
particularly fruitful. Economists have discovered for themselves 
behavioral patterns that psychologists claim they knew all along, but 
have recast them in economic terms. Economists have confirmed for 
themselves that relative incomes among peers and within communities 
typically mean more than absolute incomes; that people value what they 
already have at more than market value (the so-called ‘endowment 
effect’); that people would forgo substantial income for closer familial 
and community ties; and much more.   
 
Moreover, economists are finally conceding that “happiness” is 
culturally conditioned. Consider preferences for more income versus 
more free choice versus more leisure. We have all heard people say 
something like this: “I would be happier if I had more money, more 
choices, and more time.” It’s an assertion that’s hard to dispute. It 
underlies the credo of modern, free market, democratic societies. But 
some people  –  notably North Americans -  give relatively more weight 
to money and free choice and than to leisure, whereas others  –  such as 
our lazier and more statist cousins in Western Europe – give relatively 
more weight to leisure.  Other rich countries – notably Japan, Korea 
and Singapore – put somewhat less weight on free choice. But few in any 
                                           
21 See Dean and Dehejia (2006).  
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country or culture would refuse money, choice or leisure if they could 
have more of one without sacrificing any of the other two. Of course 
economists, dismal scientists that they are, are quick to point out that to 
get more of any one requires sacrificing some of the other two: in a 
world of fixed resources, particularly time, there’s always a “tradeoff” 
between desirable pursuits.22
 
Recently, however, some economists have moved beyond simply 
enunciating tradeoffs to question the sanctity of preferences themselves. 
Tradeoffs notwithstanding, three traditional starting assumptions of 
economic theory – we call them ‘axioms’ -- are that people are made 
unambiguously happier by more consumption, by more choice, and by 
more leisure. Yet over the past decade, many economists, even 
“mainstream” economists, have begun to question these axioms. The 
burgeoning new field of “happiness research” marries economics to 
psychology and finds, inter alia, that more is not always better than less. 
For example people in ex-communist countries often complain about the 
overwhelming career and consumer choices they must cope with under 
capitalism. As another example, retired 55-year-olds sometimes chaff 
under their new regimen of unbounded leisure. In this and a myriad of 
other ways,  economists to their credit are now pushing the limits of 
their own logic to accommodate, if ever so slightly, the yawning gap 
between what economic theory says should make people happy, and 
how people actually behave.  
 
Democracy and optimal government 
 
I want now to talk briefly about two other issues from my original 
laundry list. In our globalized 21st century, we have:  
 
No consensus about the universal feasibility or even desirability of 
democracy. 
 
No consensus even among democratic, capitalist countries about optimal 
government involvement in their economies. 
 
                                           
22 I am reminded of a lecture by H. Scott Gordon, my first  (and only) undergraduate economics 
professor, who remained my favorite even after dozens of professors in graduate school.  Professor 
Gordon  pointed out that the French revolutionary ideal of Liberte, Egalite et Fraternite, as well as the 
American Life, Liberty and Happiness involve immutable tradeoffs in practice.   
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Perhaps these issues are not puzzles or paradoxes, but they are issues 
that for most of the 20th century were relatively consensual, at least 
among the mainstream intelligentsia in free market democracies. In the 
21st century they have become decidedly controversial. 
 
The chattering classes of Western Europe and North America no longer 
universally support the rapid export of democracy to all and sundry. 
One set of epochal events that put pause to such idealism was the 
chaotic democratization of Russia. This occurred before property rights 
and other capitalist rules of law had been institutionalized, and led to 
wanton plundering of economic assets. It contrasted sharply with the 
much more benign evolution of China, which has made little pretense of 
democracy.23 Another disillusioning experience has been the failure of 
democracies to take root in much of post-colonial Africa. The most vivid 
disillusionments of all have been the twin tragedies of Afghanistan and 
Iraq.24 George W. Bush’s pledge in his 2004 state of the union address to 
put the full force of America’s military behind global democratization 
seemed oxymoronic at the time and by now seems decidedly 
counterproductive. 
 
But even those countries and commentators that are firmly committed 
to democracy debate about something more subtle: the optimal size and 
role of government. This debate seems to have revived recently among 
economists with their re-discovery of the Swedish miracle. 
 
Economists since Adam Smith have instinctively put the onus of proof 
on those who advocate a government role beyond rule of law, in 
particular protection of personal safety and property rights. Most 
economists also endorse a government role wherever actions by 
individual persons or firms might impose costs on others – what we call 
“negative externalities”.  
 
From roughly 1950 to 1975, most economists also subscribed to the 
“Keynesian Consensus”, which went beyond rule of law and 
                                           
23 See Dean (2000a) for description of  this contrast.  
 
24 For a profoundly disturbing insider’s report of the incompetence of the coalition’s post-invasion 
government of Iraq, see Stewart (2006).  Rory Stewart was deputy governor and then governor  
under Paul Bremer’s U.S. administration of the southern Iraqi provinces of  Mayson and then Dhi 
Qar from September 2003 to the “handover” in June 2004.  
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compensation for negative externalities to advocate macroeconomic 
intervention to combat unemployment, on the theoretical grounds that 
collective behavior did not necessarily correspond to the aggregation of 
rational individual actions. More broadly, governments and 
bureaucrats were seen to act in the “public interest”. At the level of 
theory, bureaucrats were deemed capable of divining “social welfare 
functions”.  
 
By the late 1970s, the “Keynesian Consensus” had given way to  
“New Classical” theory, which models macroeconomic behavior as the 
simple aggregation of rational, self-interested micro-behavior.25 Also by 
the late 1970s, “Pubic Interest” theories of government had given way to 
“Public Choice” theory, which sees governments’ choices as products of 
self-interested private interest groups and self-interested bureaucrats 
and politicians.26 Hence all government activity is suspect, since none of 
it was conceived altruistically, in the public interest.  
 
Although “New Keynesianism” supplanted “New Classicism” in the 
1980s, the enduring impact of New Classicism has been to put the onus 
on economic theorists to rationalize any macroeconomic departures 
from self-interest. For example, New Keynesians would prefer to 
rationalize sticky wages and prices as the result of the failure of 
aggregated behavior that may have been rational at micro levels to 
result in rational behavior at macro levels. This translates into a 
prescription of government policies to reduce unemployment and 
transfer income to those who remain unemployed. But New Classicists 
would prefer to rationalize downward-sticky wages either as the result 
of non-market intervention by unions and the like, or as behavior that is 
actually in the perceived self-interests of workers or firms at the micro-
level. This translates into a prescription of minimal government 
intervention.  The continued popularity of Public Choice theories of 
government reinforces the persistent influence of New Classical theory, 
so that on balance, current conventional wisdom among economists in 
the Anglo-American tradition is that government’s optimal role is a 
minimal one.   
 
                                           
25 See Dean (1980, 1982) on breakdown of the Keynesian Consensus.  
 
26 See Dean (1984) for an analysis of Public Choice theory.  
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The conventional theoretical wisdom that optimal government is 
minimal got a big boost during and since the mid-1990s, with the 
excellent economic performance of Britain, Ireland and the U.S. Among 
developed countries, these three have been in the forefront of 
deregulation, particularly in their capital and labor markets. All three 
have enjoyed higher growth of both output and productivity, as well as 
lower unemployment rates, than several large and more regulated 
countries of Western Europe, particularly France, Italy and Germany.   
 
The US is an outlier among rich countries: its per capita income and 
human capital ranks at the top, but its income equality and security at 
the bottom.27 Perhaps Americans are willing to tolerate more inequality 
and insecurity in return for higher productivity growth and a promise 
of upward mobility. Certainly the US allocates both labor and capital 
income efficiently according to productivity, except perhaps for CEO 
incomes. And the US has taken full advantage of globalization. 
 
However, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands 
manage to realize high productivity growth without sacrificing equality 
and security. These countries also have low unemployment. Germany, 
France and Belgium also boast high equality and security, but their 
unemployment rates are high. Why? 
 
In short, a puzzle arises when we look at northern Europe: Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark, Finland and the Netherlands seem to have it both 
ways: high productivity growth and low unemployment, like the U.S. 
and the U.K., but in contrast to them, high income equality and security 
as well. A related puzzle is that in the Nordic countries taxes as a 
percentage of GDP are the world’s highest: conventional wisdom is that 
both retard growth. So too their social security nets - unemployment 
insurance and welfare payments - are the world’s highest. 
Redistribution from high to low earners is also generous, via 
progressive taxes and subsidies in cash and in kind to low earners. To 
repeat: these northern European countries seem to enjoy the best of 
both worlds: high growth, low unemployment and relative income 
equity.28 By contrast, the UK and the US pay a severe price for their 
                                           
27 See again Osburn and Sharpe (2005). 
 
28 However official data do not always tell the truth. For example Sweden counts people as employed 
if they are in government make-work programs, on long-term sick leave, forced into early 
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high growth and low unemployment in terms of high and growing 
income inequity. They also pay a high price in terms of income 
insecurity.  
 
None of this is to suggest that Anglo-American insecurity is without its 
rewards. Just financial investors understand full well that high risk 
promises high rewards, so too do most people understand, at least 
intuitively, that high income insecurity offers opportunities to become 
rich. People in the US are not lining up to immigrate to Sweden, nor are 
people in Sweden lining up to immigrate to the US. But the US still 
attracts “A-type personalities” who savor the opportunity to become 
much more successful than they could in Sweden.  
 
Summary and conclusion 
 
I began with a long list of “paradoxes and puzzles”. Many of them 
emanate from people’s perceptions that globalization threatens their 
uniqueness as embodied in their historic nationalities and cultures. 
Similarly, many people are uncomfortable with change: the modern era 
of rapid technological advance coupled to globalized goods and ideas 
has brought rapid change to remote corners of the world.  Many 
paradoxes and puzzles emanate also from socio-psychological tension 
between rising average incomes and rising inequality and insecurity.29   
 
I believe that economists have begun to grapple with these puzzles more 
systematically than in the recent past. “Behavioral” economists have 
convinced most of the profession that “endowment” effects are 
pervasive: people value what they have owned for some time more than 
the market does. This phenomenon is easily extended to cover 
attachment to nationality and culture. Economists since Harvey 
Leibenstein have recognized “inertial” behavior, that persists beyond 
                                                                                                                             
retirement, or studying when they would prefer to be working.  Sweden’s official unemployment rate 
is only 6%, but a recent study by the McKinsey Global Institute estimates put it at 15-17%.  See The 
Economist (2006b) for an excellent and appropriately skeptical analysis of the extent to which the 
Nordic economies truly transcend typical macroeconomic tradeoffs.  
 
29 Vivek Dehejia and I have written about the policy challenge inherent in these and other tensions, 
and tried to formulate a concept we call “optimal globalization”. See Dean and Dehejia (2004).  
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what standard microeconomic theory would suggest is rational.  Harvey 
Leibenstein back in the 1970s called “Oblomovian” behavior.30  
 
Economists are also now beginning to see, however dimly, that 
economies and the people who populate them may choose different 
combinations of consumption, leisure and even free choice. Most 
Indians would not trade their democracy for the higher incomes offered 
under China’s quasi-dictatorship, just as most Swedes would not trade 
their security for the promise of higher income in the U.S. The message 
to ideologues who preach the virtues of one or two of these three human 
wants over the others is to recognize that tastes differ. Both the political  
left and the political right would do well to head this message.  
 
A final and laudable breakthrough in economists’ mindset is that they are 
beginning to recognize that their convenient assumption of “non-satiability” – 
fundamental to conventional economic theory since 1949 when it was codified in 
Paul Samuelson’s Foundations of Economic Analysis – does not necessarily 
correspond to human behavior. Many people do not necessarily want unlimited 
quantities of consumption, or of leisure, or of free choice, even if they were no 
tradeoffs between them: that is even if they didn’t have to sacrifice one of these 
wants to get more of the other. 
 
 Similarly, some economists have at last begun to repudiate the doctrine 
that “greed is good” – a serious distortion of what Adam Smith really 
wrote. Notably, Deidre McCloskey has recently published a lengthy 
tome called The Bourgeois Virtues: Ethics for a Capitalist Age31 that 
enumerates seven “virtues”: hope, faith, love, justice, courage, 
temperance and prudence. Drawing in detail from centuries of 
philosophical and theological thought, she argues that each of these 
virtues is necessary for capitalism to be successful and sustained. She 
then turns the argument around and argues something more startling: 
that capitalism and only capitalism can foster these virtues.  
 
                                           
30 Oblomov, the central character in Ivan Goncharev’s classic 1858 novel, Oblomov, spends the first 
half of the book in bed. Harvey Leibenstein was the inventor of “X-Inefficiency” (a reference from 
Tolstoy’s War and Peace to an unquantifiable “X-Factor” that makes the difference between one 
army’s winning a war and another army’s losing it). Leibenstein was also a pioneer of what is now 
called “behavioral” economics: see Dean and Perlman (1998a).  
 
31 McClosky (2006). 
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In a somewhat similar vein, Benjamin Friedman last year also published lengthy 
tome, called The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth.32Friedman argues 
that macroeconomic growth – not greed but growth – enables nations to pursue 
morally uplifting ends, whereas stagnation fosters futility and worse. Like 
McCloskey, he draws from centuries of philosophical and theological thought, 
particularly in his case from the Protestant Reformation, the Renaissance and 
the Enlightenment. He also draws from American, British, French and German 
history, to document that periods of slow or negative macroeconomic growth 
were periods when interest groups preyed upon each other. For example the Ku 
Klux Clan was spawned during the U.S. depression of the 1890s, not during the 
prosperous two decades after the Civil War that ended with emancipation of 
black slaves.  
Globalization has brought macroeconomic prosperity and growth to 
every country that has embraced it. It has also brought puzzles and 
paradoxes. Many of these paradoxes arise because within the macro-
economy, some benefit more than others. Other paradoxes arise because 
a society that abruptly elevates material greed to the top of its moral 
sentiments begins to fear it will lose its religion, or its culture or its 
identity.  
If we are to harness the power of globalization for good, it is crucial that 
we understand these paradoxes. It is crucial we think hard and 
creatively about how to mobilize our unprecedented prosperity toward 
those who are left behind, or toward those who believe their cultures are 
jeopardized. As Joseph Stiglitz put it recently, “…what makes the 
market economy work is that we’ve learned how to temper capitalism, 
and to ensure that the benefits are brought to a wider span of people. 
The problem of globalization is that these democratic processes are not 
in place. Globalization is undermining the ability of the nation state to 
deal with problems: workers are told you’re going to have to have 
weaker job protection and lower taxes in order to compete.” Stiglitz 
describes this process as a “race to the bottom”. 
Stiglitz is regarded by many hard-core economists as a maverick. He lays blame 
at the feet of developed nations and the institutions they dominate, like the WTO 
and the IMF, when developing countries are often not just self-serving but 
                                           
32 Friedman (2005).  
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corrupt, permitting  their elites to appropriate the fruits of globalization at the 
expense of the larger population.  
 
But in practice globalization’s imperfections are substantial and very real, no 
matter how perfect its promises in theory. Stiglitz won the Nobel Prize for 
formalizing systemic imperfections in markets that had conventionally been 
modeled otherwise. All economists, not Stiglitz, are well trained to analyze the 
shortfalls of globalization if they can break even marginally “out of the box”.33 In 
fact over the four decades that I personally have practiced the dismal science, I 
believe the last decade has been the most promising. Economists have indeed 
begun to break out of their box, both theoretically and empirically.  I am 
optimistic that they will continue to do so.  
 
One last word of caution: no one should walk away this evening believing they’ve 
heard a tirade against globalization. On the contrary, the greatest danger we face 
after half a century of successful multilateral tariff reductions is that they will 
stall, devolve into a “spaghetti bowl” of trade-diverting regional trade 
agreements, or worst of all, go into reverse. If, for example, the US economy 
slows down significantly, protectionist sentiment will grow. Millions of 
Americans believe that the goose is laying golden eggs for others but not 
themselves. Indeed, median real wages of American workers have declined by 
4% since 2001, while total factor productivity has risen 15%. Even more 
dramatically, the median wage of first-degree university graduates has fallen by 
6% since 2001.34 Correctly or incorrectly, these “median” people typically believe 
that free trade is to blame.   
 
As The Economist magazine, no bleeding heart socialist rag, put it last week, 
“…unless ordinary folk are seen to share in the gains from globalization, there 
will be growing demands for import barriers or much higher taxes on corporate 
profits … The challenge for governments is to find ways to share out the fruits of 
globalization more fairly without undermining the economy’s ability to reap the 
benefits.”35 Unless we share the eggs, those left out could kill the golden goose.  
                                           
33 Deidre McClosky is fond of teasing that most academic economists are like “boys playing in a 
sandbox”.  
 
34 This startling statistic is due to Alan Blinder at Princeton. Apparently, the fact that the overall 
wage has declined by only 4% is because high school graduates’ wages actually rose slightly. A 
plausible explanation is that routine jobs done by college graduates – computer programming, 
conventional accounting and even medical diagnoses – can be outsourced to Bangalore, whereas 
construction work, taxi driving and ‘hosptality services’ cannot.  
 
35 The Economist (2006c).  
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